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Abstract 
 
The European Union Strategy for the Danube Region is a recent initiative that aims 
to enhance sub-regional co-operation through collaboration on a series of cross-
border projects. In this paper, I present an analysis of the strategy’s preparation and 
consultation stages in order to assess the extent to which it incorporates an 
effective external dimension, capable of enhancing regional stability and co-
operation. In order to identify a set of common indicators that are indicative of 
successful sub-regional policy, I begin my research with an analysis of three existing 
sub-regional frameworks: the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, the 
Northern Dimension and the Black Sea Economic Co-operation. On the basis of this 
analysis, I identify indicators of successful sub-regional policy as: equal partnership, 
joint ownership, diverse stakeholder involvement, adequate funding and 
institutional capacity, strong level of commitment and common interests and 
objectives. When applied to the external dimension of the European Union Strategy 
for the Danube Region, the indicators reveal several weaknesses that may serve to 
reduce the strategy’s overall effectiveness. By identifying areas for improvement, 
this research aims to make a contribution to progressive sub-regional policy, while 
providing a comprehensive case study that may be subject to analysis within a 
broader theoretical framework. 
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I. Introduction 
The Danube region is a vast European territory engulfing about one fifth of 
the European Union’s (EU) area and population. Extending beyond the EU, a 
quarter of the region lies in the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova and 
incorporates a population of about 115 million. Including developed urban centres, 
rich agricultural territories and preserved natural habitats, the Danube is also home 
to some of Europe’s least developed regions. Historically divided by political 
circumstance, EU and non-EU Danube states emerge from distinct political and 
socio-economic traditions that have affected their respective capacities to 
develop infrastructure, preserve the natural environment and implement 
progressive socio-economic policy. 
To develop the under-utilized potential of the Danube region and alleviate its 
disparities, the European Union formally established the European Union Strategy for 
the Danube Region (EUSDR) in December 2009.1 D e v e l o p e d  a s  th e  E U ’ s  s ec o n d  
‘macro-regional’ strategy, the EUSDR is a sub-regional project modelled on the 
European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBR) that was established a 
year earlier to tackle cross-border issues in the Baltic Sea area.2 Despite having 
been developed along the same methodology – central to which has been the 
banner of “no new funds, legislation or institutions”3 – the EUSDR is unique in its 
inclusion of a strong external dimension. Incorporating eight EU member states 
(Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Romania, Slovak Republic 
and Slovenia) and six non-EU member states (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Moldova, Montenegro, Ukraine and Serbia) the EUSDR represents an ambitious 
project aimed at enhancing cross-regional co-operation in a diverse ethnic region. 
There is an implicit expectation that enhanced cross-border co-operation 
through the EUSDR will contribute to regional stability and integration by increasing 
networking and practical co-operation on issues confined to the low politics 
agenda. 4  By creating ongoing dialogue and actively working on common 
                                                 
1 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions: European Union Strategy for Danube Region, COM(2010) 715 final, Brussels, 8 
December 2010, p. 3. 
2 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
3 Ibid., p. 12. 
4  Interview with official A, Directorate-General for Regional Policy, European Commission, 
Brussels, 22 February 2011. 
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problems at the practical level, sub-regional frameworks such as the EUSDR 
contribute to closer integration among participating states, allowing for the building 
of trust, alleviating existing tensions and creating a co-operative atmosphere that 
may be conducive to an easier resolution of outstanding disputes.5 The building of 
effective dialogue networks is particularly important for a region that includes South 
Eastern European states that have recently emerged from war and may be 
imperative to the continued stabilization of South Eastern Europe and its integration 
into the EU. 
In this paper, I analyze the preparation and consultation phases of the EUSDR 
in order to assess the extent to which the EUSDR incorporates an effective external 
dimension, capable of enhancing regional stability and co-operation. In order to 
identify a comprehensive set of indicators that are indicative of successful sub-
regional policy, I begin with an analysis of three sub-regional structures: the EUSBR, 
the Northern Dimension (ND) and the Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC). On 
the basis of my analysis, I apply these indicators to the external dimension of the 
Danube Strategy, arguing that the indicators will have a direct impact on the 
EUSDR’s capacity to produce effective policy and contribute to regional stability 
and co-operation. 
II.  Three existing sub-regional frameworks 
EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region 
Launched in June 2009, the EUSBR represents the EU’s first ‘macro-regional’ 
strategy and constitutes the structural basis upon which the EUSDR is modelled. The 
objective of the EUSBR is to enhance regional co-operation among eight Baltic Sea 
EU member states as well as with non-EU neighbouring states. 6  External co-
operation is perceived as particularly important with Russia – the ninth state to 
                                                 
5 I. Bremmer & A. Bailes, “Sub-regionalism in the Newly Independent States”, International 
Affairs, vol. 74, no. 1, 1998, p. 133; A. Bailes, “Subregional Organizations, Security and 
Integration in Europe: What are Subregional Organizations? What is Their Role in European 
Security, Democracy and Integration?”, in V. Guõjónsdóttir (ed.), Subregional Organizations 
in Europe –Cinderellas or Fairy Godmothers?, Iceland, Institute of International Affairs and 
Centre for Small States Studies, 2008, pp. 7-10. 
6 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions concerning the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea 
Region, COM (2009) 248 final, Brussels, 10 June 2009, p. 4. 
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border the region – but may also be extended to Norway, Iceland, Ukraine and 
Belarus.7  
To ensure the support of EU member states that would not directly benefit 
from the strategy, the EUSBR was developed under the premise that no new EU 
funding, institutions or regulations would be created for its implementation. 
Although the absence of new funding has proven challenging to some sectors, 
over 80 flagship projects have been initiated to date, with 50 billion Euro in structural 
funds remaining unallocated.8  
One of the primary advantages for the EUSBR is that it benefits from several 
already existing sub-regional frameworks that are well-established in the region.9 In 
practice, the Commission evaluates that not having a new institutional framework 
has proven to be an advantage primarily because the strategy has served to focus 
the work of diverse actors, so that the EUSBR is becoming a common reference 
point and projects of individual organizations are re-oriented towards the wider 
region.10 
While the EUSBR is essentially an internal strategy, effective co-operation with 
the ‘ninth’ partner is deemed crucial to many policy areas.11 One of the main 
criticisms gauged against the strategy is therefore its lack of competence in 
external policy.12 To compensate for lack of independent external capacity, the 
EUSBR utilizes the ND, an existing sub-regional framework between the Northern 
European states and Russia, as its ‘external pillar’. 13  While most stakeholders 
welcome this arrangement, others are concerned that the ND is inappropriate 
given that it does not cover as many areas as does the EUSBR.14  
                                                 
7  C. Schymik & P. Krumrey, “EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region”, German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs, Working Paper, no. 8, 2009, p. 12. 
8  Interview with official D, Programme Officer, European Transnational and Interregional 
Cooperation, Directorate-General for Regional Policy, European Commission, via phone, 12 
April 2011. 
9 R. Bengtsson, “An EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region: Good Intentions Meet Complex 
Challenges”, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, no. 9, 2009, p.6. 
10 Interview with official D, op.cit. 
11  Interview with official C, Programme Officer, European Transnational and Interregional 
Cooperation, Directorate-General for Regional Policy, European Commission, via phone, 18 
March 2011. 
12 Bengtsson, op.cit., p. 1. 
13 Council of the European Union, Brussels European Council 14 December 2007 Presidency 
Conclusions, 16616/1/07 REV 1 CONCL 3, Brussels, 14 February 2008, p. 17. 
14 Schymik & Krumrey, op.cit., p. 12. 
  7 Mojca Kodric 
The EU is nevertheless optimistic about Russian co-operation, emphasizing the 
importance of ongoing dialogue and co-ordination at the practical level.15  Russia 
was consulted during the writing of the EUSBR and participated in numerous 
meetings, although consultation was kept at an informal level, with both Russia and 
the EU acknowledging that Russia was not an official partner in the strategy.16 
Following implementation, the Commission has encouraged practitioners working 
on flagship projects to maintain direct contact with Russian counter-parts, while it 
maintains formal contact with the Russian Foreign Ministry and is actively working to 
produce a set of common points for co-operation.17 The EU has also tried to solidify 
Russian involvement with some material incentive, allocating 20 million in additional 
funding to frameworks associated with the external dimensions of the EUSBR.18  
The European Commission is praised for the wide stakeholder consultation it 
held prior to the EUSBR’s launch. Despite overall satisfaction with this process, a 
Commission expert identifies communication as one key challenge to inclusive and 
ongoing stakeholder involvement.19 While numerous stakeholders are included in 
the EUSBR, many others could benefit from the strategy but are unfamiliar with it or 
do not know how to use it.20 The expert points to communication as a good 
example of a ‘shared task’, emphasizing the importance of national contact points 
and priority area co-ordinators in working alongside the Commission to improve 
communication among regional actors.21 
Following a year and a half of implementation, the overall experience of the 
EUSBR is fairly positive; progress has been made in numerous sectors and co-
operation is increasing. The Commission has identified key areas of concern, 
recognizing that continued funding, enhanced communication and stimulating a 
bottom-up approach will be important drivers to the EUSBR’s success. Co-operation 
with external partners has also been identified as imperative to the strategy’s 
success and has moved forward primarily as a result of collaboration at the working 
level. The EUSBR benefits from functioning within a stable region that is 
                                                 
15 Interview with official D, op.cit. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Interview with official C, op.cit. 
19 Interview with official D,  op.cit. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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characterized by a high degree of interdependence and pre-existing regional 
identity/cultural affinity.22  
The Northern Dimension 
Established in 1999, the ND was designed to improve co-operation among 
the northern EU states, Russia, Norway and Iceland through co-operation in local 
and regional projects.23 Like the EUSBR, the ND benefits from a number of existing 
sub-regional institutions that have a long history of co-operation. The primary critical 
discourse on the ND concerns Russia’s ‘equal status’ within the framework. On the 
one hand, the ND has been praised as being genuinely inclusive of outsiders, on the 
other, it has been criticized for maintaining a divide between ‘us’ and ‘them’, with 
initiatives framed on the premise of bringing ‘them’ (Russia) up to ‘our’ (EU) 
standards.24 Various actors were critical of the EU’s 1999-2006 Action Plan for not 
taking Russia’s views adequately into consideration, most notably, the Russian 
government. 25  The second Action Plan since 2007 applies a more flexible 
framework, under which Russia, Norway, Iceland and the EU are recognized as 
equal partners for the first time.26 
A major obstacle to effective Russian-EU co-operation is grounded in the 
persistence of traditional geo-political security considerations that prevent for true 
co-operation at the high politics level.27 In practice, the ND has been successful in 
developing projects that “fly below the [high political] radar”. 28 While this has 
inhibited co-operation on sensitive issues (i.e. energy) and prevented discussion of 
topics deemed important to EU member states (i.e. human rights), it has shielded 
the ND from deterioration in bilateral relations that result from intractable disputes.29 
Throughout its development, the ND has channelled resources into sectors 
that have produced tangible results and that were expected to be most promising 
for sustained co-operation. The ND Environmental Program (NDEP) serves as a good 
                                                 
22 Bengtsson, op.cit., p. 6. 
23 C. Browning & P. Joenniemi, “The European Union’s Two Dimensions: The Eastern and the 
Northern”, Security Dialogue, vol. 34, no. 4, 2003, pp. 465-466. 
24 Ibid., p. 469. 
25 Aalto, Bakkisrud & Smith, op.cit., p. 8. 
26 Ibid., p. 9. 
27 K. Laitinen, “Geopolitics of the Northern Dimension: A Critical View on Security Borders”, 
Geopolitics, vol. 8, no. 1, 2003, p. 35. 
28 Aalto, Bakkisrud & Smith, op.cit., p. ii. 
29 Ibid., pp. ii-iii. 
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example. 30 As the first sector to obtain independent resources, NDEP funding 
increased from 100 billion Euro in 2003 to 243.4 billion Euro by 2007. 31  While 
environmental co-operation has been hindered by increasing competition for 
resources32 and divergent value systems with respect to environmental preservation 
versus exploitation for profit33, several well-focused short-term projects have resulted 
in tangible results and contributed to changes in cultural valuations of the 
environment.34 
In a survey of Russian and EU practitioners working on joint environmental 
projects, the following were cited as factors having contributed to policy success: 
common interests, shared objectives, independence/autonomy from authorities, 
trust, good personal relations and long association of partners, financial and 
intellectual equality, a learn-by-doing approach and expert-level interaction. 35 
Conversely, factors identified as barriers to success included: lack of commitment, 
instability in funding and administration, financial imbalances among partners, 
conflicting interests and goals, prolonged project schedules and intricate 
negotiation processes, information problems, differences in cultural traits.36 Trust was 
rated particularly important among Russian practitioners, as was the importance of 
financial balance in projects. 37  Overall, sustained progress in the NDEP is 
anticipated provided there is a clear sense of joint ownership that is supported by 
strong commitment and the ability to attract funding from international partners.38 
Greater stakeholder involvement, a focus on small-scale projects and enhanced 
co-operation in twinning and joint day-to-day work have been identified as drivers 
of success.39  
                                                
Similar progressive areas of ND co-operation are found in the health and 
fishing sectors, with factors cited for success largely reinforcing those noted by 
 
30 N. Tynkkynen, “Experiences of Environmental Cooperation Between the Nordic Countries 
and Russia: Lessons Learned and the Way Forward”, in Aalto, Bakkisrud & Smith, op.cit., p. 73. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Laitinen, op.cit. 
33 Tynkkynen, op.cit., p. 85. 
34 Ibid., p. 82. 
35 Ibid., p. 84. 
36 Ibid., p. 86. 
37 Ibid., pp. 83-86. 
38 Ibid., p. 87. 
39 Ibid. 
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environmental practitioners.40 The environmental, health and fishing sectors are 
examples of uncontroversial areas with wide public support and common interest 
among all partners. As such, they represent ‘safe bets’ that are likely to produce 
success and formulate the basis for continued co-operation, perhaps eventually 
spilling from ‘soft’ to ‘hard’ security areas.41  While lack of co-ordinated projects and 
concrete results have been major sources of criticism, 42  the ND has made 
encouraging progress in areas that have focused on producing tangible results that 
are of benefit to all partners. Although cross-border co-operation was initially 
hampered by significant cultural, linguistic, religious and economic divides, 43  
ongoing networking has produced constructive dialogue that has served to unify 
interests and broker increased commitment from government and private funding 
institutions.  
The Black Sea Economic Co-operation 
Sub-regional co-operation in the Black Sea region dates to 1992, when 11 
states (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, 
Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine) signed the Black Sea Economic Co-operation, 
with Serbia acceding in 2004.44 The two primary objectives of the BSEC are to 
enhance confidence-building through improved dialogue on issues of common 
interest and to foster economic integration that would contribute to prosperity and 
produce functional links among the member states’ economies and in their 
interaction with EU and global markets.45 Nearly 20 years into the process, the results 
of the BSEC co-operation are marginal. To its credit, the BSEC is the most advanced 
regional co-operative organization in the Black Sea region.46 Yet, on the whole, the 
BSEC has failed to put rhetoric into practice and has been criticized for lacking a 
                                                 
40  See A. Hoel, “Best Practices in Fisheries Management: Experiences from Norwegian-
Russian Cooperation”, in Aalto, Blakkisrud & Smith, op.cit., pp. 62-63. 
41 S. Leland & A. Heol, “Learning by Doing: The Barents Cooperation  and Development of 
Regional Collaboration in the North”, in Aalto, Blakkisrud & Smith, op.cit., p. 52. 
42 Laitinen, op.cit., p. 22 
43 Leland & Hoel, op.cit., p. 38. 
44 S. Celac & P. Manoli, “Towards a New Model of Comprehensive Regionalism in the Black 
Sea Area”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 6, no. 2, 2006, p. 193. 
45 R. Aliboni, “Globalization and the Wider Black Sea Area: Interaction with the European 
Union, Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East”, Southeast European and Black Sea 
Studies, vol. 6, no.2, 2006, pp. 157-158. 
46 Celac & Manoli, op.cit., 194. 
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clear sense of realistic projects, falling short of expectations, 47 possessing ineffective 
institutions and suffering from inadequate funding48 and over-bureaucratization.49 
The failures of the BSEC can generally be attributed to diverse commitments 
and tense political relations among some of its member states, coupled with a lack 
of interest in inter-regional co-operation on the part of the EU and other external 
actors. The EU’s lack of interest in developing a stronger relationship with the BSEC 
has been identified as a hindering factor in the BSEC’s ability to evolve.50 While sub-
regional integration can serve to enhance a region’s internal capacity, a strong 
external dimension is crucial when the sub-region (or some of its members) maintain 
important ties with external partners. The EU’s continued bilateral hub-and-spokes 
relations with BSEC member states thus prevented the establishment of a common 
BSEC relationship vis-à-vis the EU and contributed to the fragmentation and 
weakening of the BSEC framework.51 
  Effective sub-regional co-operation in the Black Sea region is also made 
more difficult due to the region’s cultural, historic and political heterogeneity.52 
While sub-regional integration presents an opportunity to enhance regional identity 
in diverse areas, continued political deadlock has prevented the development of 
constructive dialogue that would enhance cultural ties or engage in identity-
building processes.53  
Analyzing Results: Indicators for Successful Sub-regional Policy 
An analysis of the EUSBR, ND and BSEC allows for the extraction of several 
generalizations. The first is the importance of a strong external dimension to the 
success of each of the sub-regional frameworks. Both the EUSBR and the ND are 
dependent on Russian co-operation for success in most policy areas. While the 
EUSBR does not incorporate Russia as a formal partner, the Commission has taken 
steps to ensure constructive co-operation. ND decision-making requires consensus 
                                                 
47 Ibid., pp. 199-203. 
48 Y. Tsantoulis, “Geopolitics, (sub)regionalism, discourse and a troubled ‘power triangle’ in 
the Black Sea”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 9, no. 3, 2009, p. 246. 
49 F. Tassinari, “A Synergy for Black Sea Regional Cooperation: Guidelines for an EU Initiative”, 
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) Policy Briefs, no. 104, 4 June 2006, p. 1. 
50 Aliboni, op.cit., pp. 160-163. 
51 Ibid., p. 162. 
52 P. Manoli, “Where is Black Sea Regionalism Heading?”, Southeast European and Black Sea 
Studies, vol. 10, no. 3, 2010, p. 326. 
53 Tsantoulis, op.cit., pp. 248-249. 
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among its partners and enforces legislation that formally recognizes non-EU 
countries as equal partners. Conversely, the BSEC has produced marginal results 
owing in part to its inability to establish a common relationship with external 
partners.  
Related to incorporating a strong external dimension is the importance of 
developing a sense of joint ownership in which all parties feel they are engaged in 
an equal partnership. Ongoing dialogue and well-established working relations are 
key to building equality and developing common interests and objectives. 
Successful projects are those that benefit from strong governance structures and 
adequate resources. Finally, the participation of stakeholders is deemed vital to 
comprehensive policy in which experts, investors and regional and local 
government bodies share responsibility in making projects work.  
On the basis of researching factors that have contributed to the success 
(and failure) of sub-regional organizations, I propose that key indicators of 
successful sub-regional policy include: joint ownership, equal partnership, inclusion 
of stakeholders, sufficient resources and institutional capacity, strong level of 
commitment, clear and common objectives. Drawing on the experiences of the 
EUSBR, ND and BSEC, I apply these indicators to the external dimension of the EUSDR 
as a means to assess whether the preparation and consultation phases of the 
strategy have been effective in setting up the EUSDR to perform as a well-
functioning sub-regional framework, equipped to tackle common cross-border 
problems and contribute to regional stability and co-operation.  
III.  Applying the Indicators: The EU Strategy for the Danube Region 
The EU developed the EUSDR in June 2009, tying the initiative to the 
attainment of EU sustainable development objectives.54 In December 2010, the 
Commission issued the “Communication on the European Union Strategy for the 
Danube Region” which outlines the general framework through which the EU aims 
to achieve its objectives.55 Supplementary to the Communication, the Commission 
                                                 
54 Council of the European Union, Brussels European Council 18/19 June 2009 – Presidency 
Conclusions, 11225/2/09 REV 2 CONCL 2, Brussels, 10 July 2009. 
55 European Commission, Communication: EU Strategy for the Danube Region, op.cit., pp. 3-
13. 
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produced an Action Plan that lists detailed projects which serve as examples of 
actions that should be undertaken in order to meet the EUSDR’s objectives.56 
The Action Plan identifies 11 priority areas that are divided into four core 
objectives: connecting the Danube region, protecting the environment in the 
Danube region, building prosperity in the Danube region and strengthening the 
Danube region.57 The comprehensive scope of the strategy includes projects in 
transport, navigation, business, energy, environment, risk management, culture, 
tourism, research, education, administration and crime.58 The actions and projects 
listed in the Action Plan were developed on the basis of an extensive consultation 
which incorporated local and regional government authorities, inter-governmental 
institutions, NGOs and other stakeholders of all 14 states participating in the 
strategy.59  
As in the EUSBR, the aim of the EUSDR is to achieve the objectives of the 
strategy with no new legislation, funding or institutional structures. Instead, the 
strategy aims to better utilize existing funds and institutions by organizing projects so 
that they meet wider regional objectives.60 Funding for the EUSDR will be provided 
through national, regional and EU funds.61 Approximately 100 billion Euro is available 
to EU member states through structural funds. 62  EU candidate and potential 
candidate states (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia) will 
receive funding from the Instrument for Pre Accession (IPA), while neighbouring 
states (Moldova and Ukraine) are eligible for funding under the European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).63 The level of financial resources 
in IPA and ENPI are substantially lower than those available to EU member states.64 It 
                                                 
56 European Commission, Commission Working Staff Document Action Plan – Accompanying 
Document to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: 
European Union Strategy for the Danube Region, SEC (2010) 1489 final, Brussels, 8 December 
2010, pp. 1-89. 
57 Ibid., p. 2. 
58 Ibid. 
59 European Commission, “Public Consultation on the EU Strategy for the Danube Region”. 
60 European Commission, Communication: EU Strategy for the Danube Region, op.cit., p. 12. 
61 European Commission, “EU Strategy for the Danube Region – Financial Resources”. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Interview with official A,  op.cit. 
  14 BRIGG Paper 4/2011 
is anticipated that additional funding will be made available by private investors 
and international financial institutions.65 
Because no new institutions will be implemented for the EUSDR, participating 
countries must co-ordinate the strategy among themselves and the Commission 
through a system of ‘priority area co-ordinators’ and ‘national contact points’.66 
Two countries have been allocated to each of the 11 priority areas as priority area 
co-ordinators.67 It will be the co-ordinators’ responsibility, in consultation with the 
Commission and relevant EU agencies and regional bodies, to plan projects, co-
ordinate schedules and funding, provide technical advice and assistance and 
maintain a network of contacts between project promoters, stakeholders and 
regional and local authorities. 68  The co-ordinators are required to keep the 
Commission abreast of all developments and to communicate with the national 
contact points that have been established in each participating country.69 Policy-
level co-ordination remains the responsibility of the Commission, in consultation with 
a High-Level Group of all member states, to which non-EU states will be invited, 
where deemed appropriate.70 While the structure of the EUSDR is modelled largely 
on the EUSBR, the needs of the Danube region are fairly distinct, owing to three 
principal differences: the incorporation of a strong external dimension through the 
inclusion of four candidate and potential candidate states and two ENP states, a 
high level of cultural and socio-economic heterogeneity within the region and a 
lack of pre-existing institutional structures.  
Equal Partnership and Joint Ownership 
To assess the sense of joint ownership and equal partnership among EUSDR 
partners, I conducted interviews with Commission regional experts and national 
representatives of all non-EU states participating in the strategy. Commission experts 
were asked about the perceived importance of including non-EU states and the 
perception of equality towards non-EU members by the Commission and EU 
member states. National representatives were asked about their sense of equal 
                                                 
65 European Commission, Action Plan, op.cit., p. 8. 
66 European Commission, Communication: EU Strategy for the Danube Region, op.cit., pp. 5, 
11-12. 
67 European Commission, “EU Strategy for the Danube Region – Priority Areas”. 
68 European Commission, Action Plan, op.cit., p. 11. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
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partnership and their level of satisfaction with inclusion in the EUSDR consultation 
and decision-making processes.  
On the question of whether there is a sense of equal partnership within this 
strategy, there is consensus among the Commission and the non-EU states that the 
EUSDR is not an egalitarian framework. 71  While non-EU states are invited to 
participate in the strategy and have a say in its direction, the central element of the 
EUSDR is that it is a policy developed and led by the EU.72 Unlike the ND, there is no 
explicit reference to an equal partnership nor is there a need for consensus for 
project implementation. Nevertheless, EU member states agree that it is important 
to include the non-EU members as much as possible at the working level, partly due 
to trans-border problems that cannot be resolved without the participation of key 
non-EU members and partly as a mechanism to speed the adoption of the acquis 
among candidate and potential candidate states.  
One national representative emphasizes that an equal partnership is a “non-
question” as long as there remains a strong imbalance of funding between EU and 
non-EU states.73 Given that each EUSDR member is required to establish a national 
contact point, with between one and three individuals responsible for its 
implementation, the strategy requires a redistribution of internal capacity that costs 
money. The preparation of national positions has required an investment of time 
and learning, with resources having been shifted from other existing sectors. As 
implementation nears and co-ordination of priority areas intensifies, the investment 
of time and resources will need to be further increased if the EUSDR is to become an 
effective strategy. For small or young countries still in the process of developing 
administrative capacities that are largely oriented towards creating institutional 
frameworks equipped to deal with future EU accession, the investment is not 
necessarily an easy one to make.  
                                                 
71 Interview with Ambassador of a Mission to the European Union (non-EU state 1), via phone, 
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With respect to their level of satisfaction with the preparation process, 
representatives of non-EU states generally responded favourably, particularly with 
reference to initial preparation stages.74 While the first preparation meeting for the 
EUSDR involved EU member states only, all subsequent meetings have included the 
non-EU states.75 Numerous conferences and networking events were held parallel 
to the consultation and there is a general sense of the non-EU countries having 
been adequately included in preparatory discussions.76  
                                                
Related to the concept of an equal partnership is a sense of joint ownership. 
Partners that feel they have been included in a process as equals are likely to feel a 
sense of ownership within that process. A Commission official rates that the general 
feeling among EU member states is that the EUSDR is a policy “by the EU, for the 
EU”.77 That decision-making capacity is retained within the EU institutions further 
indicates that the EUSDR is not a policy of joint ownership. Nevertheless, the 
structure of the EUSDR implies a degree of joint ownership in the sense that the 
authority to direct project development will remain with project co-ordinators and 
the actors funding the project.78 An analysis of the ND had indicated that Russian 
practitioners felt a sense of joint ownership in specific project areas only when more 
egalitarian levels of funding were provided by the Russian government.79 By funding 
and implementing projects, each EUSDR member should feel a sense of joint 
ownership at least within sectors in which they are actively involved. 
Joint ownership is also somewhat reflected in the allocation of priority area 
co-ordinators. Although funding decisions will be taken in selection committees of 
the EU institutions, the decisions will largely be based on recommendations 
provided by priority area co-ordinators.80 The EUSDR is divided into 11 priority areas, 
each of which are allocated to least two EUSDR member states. The level of 
participation in priority area co-ordination among non-EU states is currently at five 
separate points out of a possible minimal twelve (considering that most EU member 
 
74 Interview with diplomat A from a Mission to the European Union (non-EU state 3), Brussels, 
22 February 2011; Interviews with diplomats C, D, E, op.cit.; Interview with a Foreign Ministry 
official (non-EU state 2), via e-mail,  21 March 2011. 
75 Interview with official A,  op.cit. 
76  Interviews with diplomats A, C, D, E, op.cit.;  Interview with Foreign Ministry official, 21 
March 2011, op.cit. 
77 Interview with official B, op.cit.  
78 Interview with official A, op.cit. 
79 Tynkkynen, op.cit., p. 86. 
80 Interview with official A, op.cit. 
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states have been allocated at least two priority areas). States have volunteered to 
co-ordinate priority areas on the basis of administrative capacity and sectors’ 
relevance to national strategies. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro have 
not volunteered as priority area co-ordinators, with one country accounting for its 
absence as a function of the lesser geographic importance of the Danube region 
and another admitting that there was not enough time to choose a priority area, 
due to having received late notification.81 The Ukraine has expressed an interest in 
joining co-ordination of the “rail, road and air mobility and intermodality” alongside 
Slovenia and Serbia in the future but has thus far been constrained by internal 
political restructuring.82 The remaining three non-EU states are included as priority 
area co-ordinators, although Moldova participates in only one area. 
While there is not a sense of equal partnership within the strategy, non-EU 
states are generally satisfied that they have been well consulted in the preparation 
stages, with their proposals having been adequately reflected in the Action Plan. 
Given that final decisions on project implementation will be taken by EU or private 
funding institutions, non-EU states do not formally possess joint ownership of the 
EUSDR. On a pragmatic level, joint ownership is enforced to the extent that each 
EUSDR member is responsible for the implementation of their own proposal, with 
priority area co-ordinators largely responsible for the implementation of the sector 
as a whole. Given that priority area co-ordination is a function of interest and 
capacity, and project development is directly correlated with funding, the level of 
joint ownership among EUSDR member states and stakeholders will largely depend 
on their level of activity in the strategy – which may in turn be hindered (or 
facilitated) by institutional capacity. 
Inclusion of Stakeholders 
In preparation for developing the EUSDR Action Plan, the EU held a series of 
five conferences over a four-month period in cities of the Lower Danube. The aim of 
the conferences was to gather all relevant stakeholders and to discuss with them 
the broad topics covered by the EUSDR.83 Concurrently, between February and 
April 2010, the Commission held a public consultation that invited stakeholders and 
the general public to submit written proposals that were subsequently published on 
                                                 
81 Interview  with  Ambassador,  op.cit.,  Interview with Foreign Ministry official, 6 April 2011, 
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82 Interview with diplomat D, op.cit. 
83 European Commission, “Public Consultation on the EU Strategy for the Danube Region”. 
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the internet pages of European Commission Regional Policy. 84  In total, the 
Commission received about 80 written contributions from 72 stakeholders. 85 A 
number of these submissions were incorporated into the Commission’s first draft of 
the Action Plan and presented at the final conference in Constanta.86  
To gauge the level of satisfaction among participating stakeholders, I 
conducted a survey among contributors who submitted proposals during the 
Commission’s online consultation. The primary purpose of the survey was to 
determine the level of satisfaction among stakeholders regarding their involvement 
in the consultation and their satisfaction with ongoing communication with the 
Commission and other stakeholders.  
Although a significant number of stakeholders from all sectors were included 
in the consultation, a deeper examination reveals fundamental weaknesses and 
omissions that were prevalent throughout the process. The first concerns the 
capacity for participation in conferences by smaller and lesser known or less 
institutionally well-equipped NGOs. Although conferences were held in various cities 
to facilitate easier access for parties of different regions, participation remained 
confined to those with the capacity to finance travel and accommodation.87 The 
narrow margin of time for preparation also constituted a structural disadvantage for 
smaller organizations that are often prevalent in the Southern Danube. Within a 
period of four months, stakeholders were required to prepare, co-ordinate and 
formulate positions on the strategy – a task that only more advanced NGOs were 
able to meet.88 Even on the condition of meeting these challenges, invitation for 
active participation was limited to only a small number of speakers. Of a total of 185 
speakers, only six represented NGOs, while the remainder were members of the 
Commission, European Parliament, regional or local governments, national 
parliaments, international organizations and government bodies.89 A representative 
of a well-funded NGO recognizes this drawback, observing that  
aside [from my own organization], only a handful of NGO 
representatives were invited to speak, some of these poorly selected 
(poorly prepared or with insufficient knowledge). There were certainly 
                                                 
84 Ibid. 
85 European Commission, “Contributions to the Consultation”. 
86 S. Lütgenau, “Civil Society Participation in the European Danube Strategy”, p. 99. 
87 Ibid., p. 98. 
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other NGO representatives that would have had something to say and 
were not heard. The conferences were dominated by official 
representatives/ officials, thus [the conference was] maybe more about 
drumming up political support than really consulting local 
stakeholders.90 
 
Among stakeholders surveyed, those involved in the socio-economic 
development of poorer regions voiced greatest dissatisfaction with the 
consultation.91 One stakeholder pointed to a lack of interest in gender issues and 
the inability to obtain funding for projects related to female trafficking along the 
Danube.92 Another regrettable omission was the Roma community,93 which the EU 
has identified, in the context of the EUSDR, as “a marginalized community [...] that 
cannot be left behind”. 94  While it remains unclear whether lack of Roma 
representation is due to a lack of interest in the EUSDR, it may be concluded that it is 
attributable, at least in part, to the insufficient publicity that was afforded to the 
consultation.95  
A skewed level of stakeholder involvement is also evident from the written 
proposals that were submitted to the Commission and published on its website. Of 
the 72 stakeholders listed, only four are representatives of non-EU states.96 A survey 
to gauge the level of stakeholder satisfaction is therefore missing an integral 
feedback component – that of external representation. Despite this omission, the 
surveys are reflective of the desire for under-represented sectors to have a greater 
voice. While the overall survey response rate was 34%, the break-down response 
rate was 30% and 31% for European institutions and EU member states, respectively, 
and 80% for non-EU states.97 
Stakeholders responded quite favourably with respect to their level of 
satisfaction in the consultation, with 54% of the respondents indicating satisfaction, 
17% partial satisfaction and 29% dissatisfaction. Greater dissatisfaction was 
indicated by respondents who represented poorer socio-economic regions, from 
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both EU and non-EU states. Of non-EU states, 50% indicated dissatisfaction.98 Of 
respondents who were satisfied with their inclusion in the consultation, most cited 
the primary reason as being the inclusion of their organization’s proposal in the 
Action Plan. A good opportunity for networking was frequently cited as a primary 
strength. 
Reasons for dissatisfaction in the consultation included: proposal not finding 
a place in the Action Plan; civilian, educational and social interests having been 
marginalized; lack of integrated approach among different sectors; the first drafts 
of the Action Plan not having been available to the wider public; personal contacts 
necessary for opportunity to comment; an ‘almost zero’ influence in decision-
making despite active engagement in the consultation.99 
Respondents were less satisfied with ongoing communication, with 39% 
indicating satisfaction, 17% partial satisfaction and 43% dissatisfaction. 100  
Dissatisfaction among non-EU states rose to 75%.101 Stakeholders indicated that 
ongoing communication was very much based on personal contacts and of a 
complexity that was difficult for smaller organizations to follow. 102 While a few 
stakeholders indicated that they were in contact with the Commission following the 
consultation, most noted that they had not received any feedback or were no 
longer in communication with project co-ordinators, members of the Commission or 
other stakeholders.103 
The results of the survey with respect to inclusion in the consultation and on-
going communication are thus somewhat mixed. Despite the negligible 
contribution of external stakeholders in the online consultation, a high response rate 
from stakeholders of non-EU states suggests a strong desire for involvement. 
Generally, there is a fair level of satisfaction with the consultation, but a negative 
trend is discernible from wealthier to poorer member states, with the greatest level 
of dissatisfaction voiced by non-EU states.  Several respondents, including those 
who were satisfied with the inclusion of their own organization’s proposals in the 
consultation and/or Action Plan, recognized the need for more egalitarian inclusion 
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of smaller organizations and civil society. Stakeholders were less satisfied with the 
level of ongoing communication, pointing to the need for contacts in order to 
comment on actions or retain communication with the Commission. In general, a 
strong desire was expressed for on-going communication that was better co-
ordinated and more manageable and that included the opportunity for feedback 
for a greater number of stakeholders. 
Sufficient Resources and Institutional Capacity 
On analyzing the element of ‘equal partnership/joint ownership’, I pointed to 
the imbalance of funding for EU member states and third countries as aggravating 
the perception of an unequal partnership. It follows that insufficient funding is a 
problem in absolute terms for states that simply do not have the resources to 
implement projects that require a larger investment of funds.  
The opportunity for non-EU states to obtain funding from IPA and ENPI 
programs is very small. This is primarily due to limited available funding, but also 
because much of the funding has already been allocated to projects that are 
important to the recipients, who are therefore opposed to a re-structuring of existing 
funds.104 A Commission expert deducts that the only solution would be for the non-
EU member states to fund themselves, which he concedes is unlikely.105 While there 
is substantial interest from private funding institutions, countries with already high 
existing debts cannot borrow any more money. The expectation is thus that the 
non-EU states would invest in projects that do not require a large investment of 
capital.106  
But given that a major source of poverty in the region is lack of development 
due to poor infrastructure and connectivity, the key to development is widely held 
to be within relatively expensive projects related to infrastructure, navigability and 
energy connections. The Bosnia-Herzegovina paper, for example, points to the 
stagnation of navigation along the Sava River, noting a 20% decline in the use of 
water transport among Central and Eastern Europe, as contrasted with an over 10% 
rise in the EU.107 The navigability potential for the Danube and its tributaries is large, 
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yet the required investment for port infrastructure and maintenance will necessitate 
funding that the countries either do not have or will have difficulty in obtaining from 
stakeholders that are reluctant to invest resources into countries108 or projects they 
fear may fail.109 
Similar difficulties are evident with respect to institutional capacity. National 
representatives of non-EU states broadly agree that an effective institutional 
structure is integral to the success of the strategy.110 M a n y  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  s e e  a  
focused, integrated and comprehensive approach towards the EUSDR at the 
national level.111 There is optimism that this will develop through networking and 
‘learning processes’ that result from ongoing interaction with experts from EU 
member states who may have more knowledge and expertise in given areas.112 The 
process of on-going interaction with the EU has been praised as beneficial, inclusive 
and important.113 There are calls to expand this interaction to the expert and 
technical levels, particularly with exchange programs, like twinning.114  
Regionally, the most active non-governmental actor in the Danube region is 
the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR). Most 
remaining NGOs are nationally, regionally and locally concentrated in individual 
states. Several national representatives have noted that local and regional 
stakeholders are actually quite numerous.115 Trans-border co-operative frameworks 
that existed before the Balkan conflicts are again beginning to emerge. The 
neighbouring states point to the existence of regional organizations that have 
valuable insights into regional issues pertinent to the EUSDR but that remain in poor 
contact with national administrations.116 One diplomat emphasizes that it would be 
important for the EUSDR campaign to be closer to these regions, given that “they 
are talking about the same things, they have the same knowledge. The problem is 
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that the NGOs are still in a process of development and they lose competition with 
organizations that have better capacities.”117 
The framework of the EUSDR is formulated so that there is a national contact 
point for each member of the strategy. It is the responsibility of the national contact 
point to maintain ongoing communication with the European Commission as well as 
with stakeholders and regional and local authorities within the respective country. 
Yet, Dieringer, Laukó and Schneider observe that the “national co-ordinator has 
proved already to be in a gate-keeper position in some countries and established – 
by accident or by ambition – a kind of inter-governmental layer bottlenecking 
information flow and access.”118 In many countries this may simply be due to a lack 
of administrative capacity.  
The timeframe between the Commission’s initial invitation to present national 
position papers and supplementary contributions was approximately six months.119  
Participating countries were thus required to gather information and develop a 
working strategy within a very short period of time. For national governments 
possessing limited administrative capacities and poor existing communication 
channels with regional stakeholders, the process of producing a national position 
paper may simply have developed with an oversight to wider sub-national 
consultation. While the Commission’s consultation constituted a formidable effort to 
reach interested parties at a horizontal level, many existing regional organizations in 
the non-EU states were not included on its mailing list, nor could they reasonably be 
without some intervention at the national levels. While several non-EU states 
emphasize the importance of incorporating strong communication with local and 
regional stakeholders, there is less recognition that this needs in part to be done 
through the national administrations themselves.  
Information bottlenecks may also occur as a result of countries wishing to 
retain projects under national control. A stakeholder criticizes that “programs and 
funds are often targeted at national projects only (and not at the much needed 
cross-border projects) or the processes of funding cross-border projects from 
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national funds are cumbersome or even incompatible between different 
countries”.120 While this may in part be attributed to the administrative bottlenecks 
outlined above, there is concern among stakeholders that the EUSDR is consciously 
being used to advance national projects or narrow business interests. 121  Two 
stakeholder contributions mention corruption as a primary obstacle to the EUSDR’s 
success, with one EU citizen stating that the “overall process for inclusion of projects 
is available again to a handful of people from the central government, which will 
l e a d  t o  p r o j e c t s  w i t h  a  h i g h  d e g r e e  o f  c o r r u p t i o n . ” 122  A means to increase 
transparency and reduce the possibility of corruption would be to include a wider 
number of local and regional actors by opening up channels of communication 
both vertically, from the national co-ordinator level, and horizontally, from the 
Commission. 
The reality of the Danube region is that prosperity gaps have widened 
between regions in the Upper and Lower Danube, while development of central 
European regions has continuously improved.123 The regions that are included in the 
strategy have substantially different capacities in terms of knowledge, innovation, 
research, development and institutions.124 While this is evident among EU member 
states, inter-state and regional differences become even wider when including the 
non-EU states. The Serbian position paper, for example, points to a 9:1 wealth 
differential among most and least developed municipalities, with many of the 
poorest located in the Danube region.125 
The EUSDR could provide a mechanism through which disparities in wealth 
and administrative capacity may be addressed in the longer term. Unfortunately, 
under the existing EUSDR framework, it is the more advanced member states and 
their respective regions that are best equipped to capitalize on the resources 
available through the EUSDR – both in terms of institutional capacity and access to 
funding. The paradoxical outcome may be such that imbalanced support towards 
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more advanced regions may actually result in exacerbating regional disparities as 
opposed to alleviating them.126 
Common Interests/Objectives and Level of Commitment 
To assess the level of common interests/objectives and political commitment, 
I begin with an analysis of the Action Plan, identifying projects that member states 
and stakeholders have thus far adopted a lead in. An analysis of the level of 
commitment based on the current status of the Action Plan may be premature 
given that the EUSDR is still waiting for endorsement from the European Council and 
the work of priority area co-ordinators in finding funding for many projects is yet to 
begin. It nevertheless provides an overview of members that have been most 
active to date. It also reveals a discrepancy between areas of interest and 
corresponding levels of commitment. “Improving mobility and navigability”, for 
example, is a key point of interest for all non-EU states,127 yet none have taken a 
lead in any projects within this sector. It was Serbia that had proposed adding a 
security dimension to the strategy, but has not yet taken a lead in this area.128 “To 
continue demining in the mine suspected areas of the Danube”129 is a project 
directly concerning Croatia,130 yet it has taken no lead on this issue. Numerous 
countries are interested in “promoting tourism, culture, people to people 
contact”,131 yet again, no leads have been taken. Most of the projects thus wait for 
leadership/funding from interested stakeholders or the EU. 
Contrasting pragmatic commitment in taking a lead on projects, a strong 
level of rhetorical commitment to the EUSDR has been expressed by ministers and 
high-level politicians of all non-EU states.132 For non-EU states, the importance of the 
EUSDR is attributable, first, to the tangible benefits it is expected to deliver and, 
second, and perhaps more importantly, to its perceived linkage with EU 
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accession.133 Non-EU states generally believe that the adoption of EU standards 
and regulations, coupled with increased co-operation with the EU and 
advancement of regional development will bring the states closer to EU 
accession.134 Within the EU, formal separation between the EUSDR and accession is 
deemed important, firstly, to alleviate pressure on non-EU member states from 
feeling that they need to perform well under the EUSDR framework in order to 
advance their accession and, secondly, to avoid non-EU member states from 
linking positive performance under the EUSDR with better accession prospects.135 
Informally, there is recognition among EU member states that the advancements 
made under the EUSDR may serve as a positive mechanism for non-EU states to 
adopt measures that would better prepare them for EU integration.136 
                                                
IV. Conclusions 
In this paper, I have applied indicators of successful sub-regional policy to 
the preparation and consultation phases of the EUSDR for the purpose of assessing 
whether the strategy includes a strong external dimension that will contribute to the 
EUSBR’s capacity to facilitate regional stability and co-operation. I began with an 
analysis of three existing sub-regional frameworks (the EUSBR, ND and BSEC), 
showing that a strong external dimension is an integral component of successful 
sub-regional policy. By examining each of these frameworks, I developed a set of 
indicators that are correlated with the level of success of sub-regional policy and 
applied the findings to the preparation and consultation phases of the EUSDR.  
In developing the EUSDR as a generalizable case study, it is important to bear 
in mind that sub-regional frameworks are established with particular objectives and 
in the context of circumstances that may be unique to the region. It is therefore 
reasonable to expect some divergence with respect to the conditions that must be 
met in order for frameworks to function effectively, and it may be necessary to 
grant different weights to tested criteria, depending on geographic and relational 
contexts. Nevertheless, an analysis of existing sub-regional frameworks allows for the 
extraction of common indicators with regard to a general capacity for success. I 
identify these as joint ownership, equal partnership, stakeholder involvement, 
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institutional and funding capacity, level of commitment, and common interests and 
objectives. To this should also be added isolation from high politics. This element has 
been important for the success of the EUSBR and the ND, which remain reasonably 
well isolated from intractable issues, while it has contributed to the failures of the 
BSEC, which has been constrained in its ability to transform rhetoric into practice 
owing to unresolved political disputes among its members. Like the EUSBR and the 
ND, it is reasonable to expect that the EUSDR should benefit from isolation of more 
intractable problems, due to its pragmatic focus on local and regional projects that 
are confined to the low politics agenda. 
When applied to the external dimension of the EUSDR, the indicators reveal 
several fundamental weaknesses that may be expected to decrease the strategy’s 
overall success. Non-EU states and Commission representatives agree that the 
EUSDR is not an equal partnership, nor do its decision-making procedures reflect 
joint ownership. Nevertheless, there is satisfaction that the EUSDR incorporates an 
inclusive framework that is based on networking, ongoing dialogue and the 
inclusion of all participating state proposals within the Action Plan. Non-EU states are 
satisfied with their level of involvement in the preparation stages of the strategy, 
while Commission representatives emphasise that the inclusion of non-EU countries is 
deemed important and should be equalized as much as possible at the working 
level.  
The inclusion of stakeholders at the local and regional levels represents a 
more fundamental problem, given that participation was largely confined to larger 
organizations that are based in more advanced EU member states. While an 
overview of the consultation initially suggests wide stakeholder involvement, a 
deeper analysis reveals important omissions that have resulted in the 
marginalization of organizations from non-EU states and lesser attention paid to 
NGOs representing the needs of poorer socio-economic sectors and civil society. 
Ongoing communication with the Commission following the consultation has been 
rated as poor among several stakeholders and is premised on having contacts 
within the Commission. Representatives of non-EU states have pointed to the 
importance of maintaining strong contacts and including local and regional 
stakeholders within the EUSDR, but there is less recognition among non-EU states 
that this process must be facilitated not only by the Commission, but also by 
national contact points and priority area co-ordinators that will be working closer to 
the regions. 
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While non-EU states afford a high level of rhetorical commitment to the 
strategy, both in recognition of the practical benefits it could bring to their region 
and as a result of the desire to bring their countries closer to EU 
integration/accession, practical commitment to specific projects is hindered by 
limited institutional and funding capacities. The EUSDR depends on existing 
institutions to co-ordinate projects and disseminate information, while it relies on 
funding from national governments and local stakeholders, supplemented with 
resources from structural, IPA and ENPI funds. The paradoxical outcome of this 
framework may be that more advanced E U  m e m b e r  r e g i o n s  w i l l  b e  b e t t e r  
equipped to extract resources from the strategy while regions in greatest need of 
support will remain left behind. This imbalance is further reflected in an analysis of 
common interests/objectives. National position papers of non-EU states reflect the 
overall objectives of the strategy and all national governments have expressed a 
strong commitment to carrying out its mandate. Nevertheless, significant regional 
disparities imply that different regions have diverse and specific needs that will have 
to be addressed individually if the overall objective of the strategy is to be 
adequately addressed.  
These conclusions are important in their potential to contribute to policy that 
may be applied to the EUSDR (and other sub-regional frameworks) in order to make 
the framework as effective as possible. The EUSDR is an important strategy both for 
the EU and its external partners. It addresses a diverse region that encompasses one 
fifth of the EU’s territory and significant problems that can effectively be addressed 
only through trans-border co-operation. The strategy is particularly important to 
peripheral areas that have been marginalized; areas with relatively limited 
institutional capacity, deteriorating or limited infrastructure, poor social policy and 
outdated environmental practices. Yet many of these areas lie in non-EU states that 
are likely to receive the least support in the policy’s implementation phases. 
At the outset of this paper, I introduced linkages between comprehensive 
security and sub-regional organizations, pointing to ongoing networking and 
working level co-operation on ‘low politics/soft security’ issues as contributing to 
capacity-building and trust – factors that should facilitate stability and integration. 
The EUSDR can become an integral part of this process, provided it is implemented 
in a manner and with expectations that are realistic for non-EU states to achieve. 
Non-EU states praise the level of networking and two-way communication that the 
preparation process for the EUSDR has thus far produced. This practice can be 
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strengthened in the implementation phase through increased institutional and 
technical support that would provide marginalized regions with better tools to forge 
a destiny that is based on joint ownership and equal partnership. To capitalize on 
expertise, enhance transparency and build interest that may attract a higher level 
of investment, local and regional stakeholders must be included in this process as 
much as possible. A more integrated region with a lower level of disparity, higher 
socio-economic output and sustainable growth may reasonably be expected to 
become an area that is increasingly stable and better prepared for future EU 
integration. 
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